A Theory of Propositions
Journal Title: Logic and Logical Philosophy - Year 2016, Vol 25, Issue 1
Abstract
In this paper I present a new theory of propositions, according to which propositions are abstract mathematical objects: well-formed formulas together with models. I distinguish the theory from a number of existing views and explain some of its advantages – chief amongst which are the following. On this view, propositions are unified and intrinsically truthbearing. They are mind- and language-independent and they are governed by logic. The theory of propositions is ontologically innocent. It makes room for an appropriate interface with formal semantics and it does not enforce an overly fine or overly coarse level of granularity.
Authors and Affiliations
Nicholas J. J. Smith
Keywords
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