One-reason decision making in risky choice? A closer look at the priority heuristic
Journal Title: Judgment and Decision Making - Year 2008, Vol 3, Issue 6
Abstract
Although many models for risky choices between gambles assume that information is somehow integrated, the recently proposed priority heuristic (PH) claims that choices are based on one piece of information only. That is, although the current reason for a choice according to the PH can vary, all other reasons are claimed to be ignored. However, the choices predicted by the PH and other pieces of information are often confounded, thus rendering critical tests of whether decisions are actually based on one reason only, impossible. The current study aims to remedy this problem by manipulating the number of reasons additionally in line with the choice implied by the PH. The results show that participants’ choices and decision times depend heavily on the number of reasons in line with the PH — thus contradicting the notion of non-compensatory, one-reason decision making.
Authors and Affiliations
Benjamin E. Hilbig
Keywords
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