Some Remarks on the Google ECJ Ruling (C-131/12)

Journal Title: Krytyka Prawa. Niezależne studia nad prawem - Year 2014, Vol 6, Issue 1

Abstract

A large number of opinions have been expressed about the decision C-131/12. Initially, Google's defeat has been widely welcomed as the giant had suffered a bitter defeat. After a first joy about the containment of Google's arrogance it became clear that the excessive claim for right to be forgotten will dry out our sources of information. Can privacy be seen as a fear for diversity of opinion? It may be due to the tension between data and reputation protection on the one hand and the possibility to protect against lies and fraud on the other hand. It is not just Google's freedom of expression, which is in the center of our interests. We want to find informations and Google is helping us in this regard. Forcing Google to suppress the information flow can not hinder Google to earn money. If we go through the opinion of the Advocate General and compare it with the reasoning of the ECJ, then we come to the conclusion, that the ECJ had to decide in this a way on the grounds of the current legal status. The ECJ was standing with the back to the wall, because it has to apply the current law and this left no option open. Thus, the ECJ could not follow the opinion of the Advocate General. A different decision would have forced the ECJ to cancel substantial parts of the Data Protection Directive (95/46/EC) due to the violation of the EU Charter of Fundamental Rights - especially its Article 11 – and this was not an option. The judgment shows, why the data protection directive does not correspond to the present situation. It is clear now, where the proposal of a Data Protection Regulation requires a substantial improvement. The networked world does not work according to the Cartesian model. But especially in the exaggeration of informational self-determination is the risk of its destruction as it represents a central and important concept of data protection. The judgment calls into question the need for a Data Protection Regulation: Thus, the gap between legal privacy and network reality will be further increased. But what is the right way? By trying to understand the Internet and the Web with its technical and social lawfulness? In the following, I will analyze the judgment in order to support my allegations, and to develop a proposal for consequences of the judgment of the ECJ.

Authors and Affiliations

Dr. Rastislav Funta, PhD, LL. M.

Keywords

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  • EP ID EP62528
  • DOI -
  • Views 99
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How To Cite

Dr. Rastislav Funta, PhD, LL. M. (2014). Some Remarks on the Google ECJ Ruling (C-131/12). Krytyka Prawa. Niezależne studia nad prawem, 6(1), 115-125. https://www.europub.co.uk/articles/-A-62528