Elicitation of normative and fairness judgments: Do incentives matter?
Journal Title: Judgment and Decision Making - Year 2015, Vol 10, Issue 2
Abstract
Krupka and Weber (2013) introduce an incentive-compatible coordination game as an alternative method for elicitation of normative judgments. I show, however, that people provide virtually the same responses in incentivized and non-incentivized versions of the Krupka-Weber game. Besides ratings of social appropriateness, I also elicit ratings of fairness of all possible offers in an ultimatum game. Ratings of social appropriateness and fairness are similar for low offers (below or equal to the equal split), but not for high offers which are judged to be more appropriate than fair.
Authors and Affiliations
Štěpán Veselý
TEMAP2.R: True and Error model analysis program in R
True and Error Theory (TET) provides a method to separate the variability of behavior into components due to changing true policy and to random error. TET is a testable theory that can serve as a statistical model, allow...
You don’t want to know what you’re missing: When information about forgone rewards impedes dynamic decision making
When people learn to make decisions from experience, a reasonable intuition is that additional relevant information should improve their performance. In contrast, we find that additional information about foregone reward...
Ambiguity aversion in a delay analogue of the Ellsberg Paradox
Decision makers are often ambiguity averse, preferring options with subjectively known probabilities to options with unknown probabilities. The Ellsberg paradox is the best-known example of this phenomenon. Ambiguity has...
Magical thinking in predictions of negative events: Evidence for tempting fate but not for a protection effect
In this paper we test two hypotheses regarding magical thinking about the perceived likelihood of future events. The first is that people believe that those who “tempt fate” by failing to take necessary precautions are m...
Synergistic effects of voting and enforcement on internalized motivation to cooperate in a resource dilemma
We used psychological methods to investigate how two prominent interventions, participatory decision making and enforcement, influence voluntary cooperation in a common-pool resource dilemma. Groups (N=40) harvested reso...